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Abstract
Once precisely defined so as to include just the explanation’s act, the notion of explanation should be regarded
as a central notion in the engineering of intelligent system—not just as an add-on to make them understandable
to humans. Based on symbolic AI techniques to match intuitive and rational cognition, explanation should be
exploited as a fundamental tool for inter-agent communication among heterogeneous agents in open multi-agent
systems. More generally, explanation-ready agents should work as the basic components in the engineering of
intelligent systems integrating both symbolic and sub-/non-symbolic AI techniques.
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1. On the Meaning of Terms
Whereas computer science (CS) has gone so far and so deep that can nowadays be claimed to belong
within the social sciences [1], its basic foundations still lay in the ground of hard sciences, possibly
on the edge of classic disciplines such as logics and mathematics. Along with the contemporary
claim that “All science is computer science” [2], this makes the use of basic terms and definitions
a problematic matter. In fact, the need for precise and non-ambiguous definitions of concepts and
notions somehow clashes with the number of terms and ideas that, coming from human sciences,
have (also) a more or less widespread and consolidated “commonsense” meaning—which hardly copes
well with the requirements of scientific definition.
In the so-called “AI Renaissance”, with the pervasive emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) tech-
niques everywhere in human activity and social organisations, this has also become an issue for
notions and concepts for intelligent systems—also because popularisation of AI achievements and
results have further mixed up scientific and everyday words. Thus, terms such as ‘learning’, ‘under-
standing’, ‘explaining’, just to mention a few, have become at the same time more and more central
in AI literature, and less and less well-defined and understood—as they are widely used in both the
scientific context and popular science. As one may expect, a flow of specific literature is nowadays
dealing with that issue: this is for instance the case of the field of explainable artificial intelligence –
XAI [3] –, where the term and the very notion of explanation represent one of the main subject of
scientific debate—see e.g., [4].
However, it also worth to point out that the same issue is particularly relevant in the AI field, where
the very notion of what is intelligence – and so, what is artificial intelligence – have always been a
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powerful undercurrent of inner conflict in the field itself. In straight comparison, the same does not
hold for the CS field, where the issues ‘what is computing’ and ‘what is computer science’ are the
subject of a more or less conventional epistemic debate—see e.g. [5].
So, why is the issue of basic terms, concepts, and definitions so much more critical to AI than CS,
where it is a key issue anyways? The problem is likely to be related to the main objects of study:
whereas computation is mostly perceived as an artificial product of human invention, intelligence is
a sort of natural phenomenon that we (i) observe around us, but mostly in ourselves, and (ii) use
to understand the world and make science—in the broadest acceptation of the term. The fact is, un-
derstanding intelligence is not (just) an issue for AI: instead, it is first of all an issue for humans in
general—and, all things considered, it always has been.
2. Rationality vs. Intuition
2.1. Esprit de finesse vs. esprit de géométrie
Le cœur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît point [6]
The efforts to understand the ways in which human cognition works date back to the earlier human
thinkers; however, it is in the XVII century that the distinction between rational and non-rational
thought becomes radical. That in fact is the age when the two most influential rationalistic systems
(by Descartes and Spinoza, respectively) were born—where rationalism, in Western philosophy, is “the
view that regards reason as the chief source and test of knowledge”1 In response to that (“Descartes
useless and uncertain” [6]), philosophers such as Blaise Pascal fiercely opposed to the view that the
rational process was to be considered as the only possible way for human cognition. Apart from
the anatomical identification of the heart (cœur) as the main locus of non-rational cognition (“Nous
connaissons la vérité non seulement par la raison mais encore par le cœur”), the distinction is clear
between the things that we can understand by means of reason (such as mathematical proofs) and
the things reason can not comprehend. This is well expressed in Pascal by the duality between the
esprit de géométrie and the esprit de finesse: the former representing the rational process, seen as vues
lentes, dures et inflexibles (slow, difficult, inflexible views); the latter representing the intuitive mind,
bringing about immediate comprehension of the things, characterised by the “souplesse de la pensée”
(flexibility of thought).
In spite of the naïveté that contemporary scientist may observe in that distinction, modern epis-
temology has inherited the same dichotomy, when it opposes in the same way the “comprehension”
against the objective and analytic “explication”.2 Also, the same distinction seems to apply not just to
the cognition process, but also to the knowledge itself.
2.2. Analytical vs. intuitive
Psychology is one of the is foundational AI sciences: so, it cannot come as a surprise that the contrast
between the two historical schools in psychology – that is, cognitivism against behaviourism [7] –
was about the theory of the mental processes—cognitivism built around it, behaviourism refusing it.
Nowadays, one of the most relevant distinctions in psychology is the one between intuitive vs. ana-
lytical cognition, as the sorts of cognition exploited in reasoning and decision making—see Figure 1.




Figure 1: Two sorts of cognitive processes for human reasoning and decision making [8]
Analytical cognition is voluntary, effortful, limited in capacity, and slow. Intuitive cognition involves un-
conscious situational pattern synthesis and recognition unconstrained by working memory limitations.
Intuitive cognition is independent of conscious ‘executive’ control, large in capacity, and fast. These two
types of reasoning and decision making can be dissociated experimentally and neurologically.” [8].
Intuitive cognition is the default whenever analytical cognition is faced with tasks it cannot ac-
complish, and is critical to survival. As such, intuitive cognition – rather than analytical cognition
– is seen as representing the core of human cognition, being instrumental in handling the situated
complexities of everyday living for humans.
2.3. Symbolic vs. sub-/non-symbolic
Even though the existence and the importance of non-rational human cognition is so well-known and
understood, the evolution of AI over the years have shown a somehow wavering awareness of this.
On the one hand, the dichotomy “intelligent process vs. intelligent behaviour” has informed the
AI field since its very beginning, basically classifying the different AI approaches as, respectively,
capturing and exploiting the basic mechanisms of human intelligence vs. behaving intelligently no
matter how. Yet, most of the “intelligent process” approaches adopt a rational interpretation of hu-
man cognition, focussing on the mechanisms of rational human reasoning rather than on the whole
spectrum of human cognitive processes. In fact, rational interpretation is where most of the symbolic
AI techniques are grounded – e.g., automatic reasoning, planning, argumentation, logic programming
–, and, by the way, also where most of the time is spent when teaching AI still today. For instance,
the most widely used textbook for AI at some point defines AI as “the study of rational action” [9,
page 366], there implicitly promoting a mostly-rational interpretation of the overall field.
However, non-rational, non-symbolic techniques basically terminated the first AI winter—e.g.,
proving that intelligence could exist without neither (rational, symbolic) reasoning [10] nor (sym-
bolic) knowledge representation [11]. Also, the recent surge of the the so-called “AI Renaissance”
has been mostly sparked by biologically-inspired yet non-rational, sub-symbolic techniques—such as
deep learning ones.
As a result, nowadays most techniques in the AI field can be classified as either symbolic or sub-/non-
symbolic ones. With some obvious degrees of approximation, this classification basically matches
the aforementioned distinction between analytic vs. intuitive cognition in psychology: symbolic ap-
proaches are rational, have huge requirements in terms of resources, are slow, and fit for a limited
range of problems; whereas sub-symbolic approaches are mostly non-rational, have limited require-
ments in terms of resources, and work fast in a huge number of scenarios—and we have no clear
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understanding yet of why they do actually succeed.
So, in spite of the overwhelming successes of non- and sub-symbolic techniques, why does AI so
much still revolves around symbolic techniques? Is there any motivation left for symbolic techniques
per se, beyond the current wave of XAI calling for integration with sub-symbolic techniques [12]?
Overall, which are the reasons today for AI to be (also) rational, nourish its esprit de géométrie,
cultivate analytic cognition?
3. Sharing
3.1. Sharing is human
Our common understanding of science nowadays is grounded upon notions such as reproducibility
and refutability [13], which basically reflect the fact that science for humans is a social construct.
However, the need for sharing scientific results pre-dates our recent understanding of the conceptual
foundation of science: even in the early years of Mediterranean science, some thousands years ago,
scholars used to share their results by exchanging letters via sea mail.
This is because sharing is not just a means towards science: it is the foundation of human culture.
Actually, when comparing humans against other living species (primates, in particular) it is quite
apparent that cumulative culture is unique to people: “The remarkable ecological and demographic
success of humanity is largely attributed to our capacity for cumulative culture, with knowledge and
technology accumulating over time” [14]. Unlike most primates, humans have the innate disposition
to share knowledge: as a result, hiding knowledge is mostly considered as an antisocial behaviour. By
the way, this might also be one of the motivations behind open source technologies, the open access
movement in science, the “recognise sharing as the default” principle for pervasive computing [15],
as well as the hidden psychological cause of the common despise for “scholars hiding in their ivory
towers”—knowledge bearers with no will to share.
So, the contemporary contempt for fact checking on the social networks (after the issues taken
against the use of fake news in political competitions) is in some sense the social counterpart of
the scientific concern for a shared process for stating scientific evidence and results— particularly
emphasised these days by the worldwide run for COVID-19 therapies and vaccines. That is: at every
level, human knowledge is shared, and the same holds for the processes to assess knowledge itself.
3.2. Sharing is rational
Humans are hyper-social animals: “We never think alone” [16]. We may quite safely assume that our
rational capability as humans evolved predominantly after our ability to interact socially—or, at most,
they co-evolved.
Yet, in order to support sharing of knowledge, humans have invented and developed cognitive
and physical tools – language, writing, books, the Web – which allow for rational representation of
knowledge. This makes sharing effective, and extend its span over time and space, so that human can
share knowledge with others even though they are not in the same place at the same time. Rational
tools for knowledge sharing make it possible for human culture to be systematic and cumulative.
Overall, sharing knowledge among humans definitely comes along with symbolic representation and
reasoning.
So, though there is intelligence without representation [11] and reason [10], there is no (systematic)
sharing without reason and representation. Sharing requires reason because it requires a form of
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conversation between humans, and conversation requires mind reading – as the ability to understand
motivations, beliefs, goals of others –, or, more generally, a theory of mind [17].
So, maybe the heart knows things that the reason does not, and maybe it knows more: however,
what if that sort of knowledge cannot be (easily) shared? In other terms, how can we share the results
of non-rational, intuitive cognitive processes? How can we share what we “humanly know”, without
being hampered by those “vues lentes, dures et inflexibles” that sharing asks for in order to work with
some predictability?
Humans actually have the answer: they do (try to) explain. When they need to share the results
of their intuition, they try to (make up and) share a rational explanation with other humans around
them: so, explanation is how humans try to make intuitive and analytical cognition match.
Yet, what is an explanation? Or, at least, where can we find a suitable acceptation of the notion
of explanation that could help us defining it as the rational act of an explanator – whichever his/her
nature – trying to share his/her knowledge?
4. Explanation
4.1. Explanation everywhere
Since when explainability has become a hot topic in AI research, the very notion of explanation –
and accessory notions such as interpretation and understandability alongside – has become the core
of many research efforts, and undergone a constant flow of diverse and (sometimes) even extrava-
gant definitions. This is likely to be due to the two problems mentioned at the beginning of this
paper: the still weak settling of a commonly-acknowledged scientific method for CS and AI, and the
pervasiveness of the common meaning of the terms.
For instance, when the GDPR [18] starts to recognise “the citizens’ right to explanation” [19], it
encompasses in the same acceptation of the term ‘explanation’ both the explanator act aimed at mak-
ing things understandable, and the explainee act aimed at understanding things. Whereas this might
be a commonly-acknoweldged acceptation of the term – and a very important stand for EU citizens,
as well – at the same time it might be not the best choice for a well-grounded and technically-useful
scientific definition of the term.
Also, as noticed in [4], many definitions in the literature do not really keep the two notions of
explanation and interpretation well distinct and separated—as we probably do in our common use of
the language. Whereas the validity of the related scientific results is most typically not affected by
that, the scientific value of those definitions per se is somehow limited.
4.2. Noetics & semiotics
It should not come as a surprise that a useful contribution towards a well-founded definition of the no-
tion of explanation comes from the theory of teaching—from the teaching of mathematics, specifically.
There, given the fully-abstract nature of mathematical concepts, the understanding of mathematics
can be labelled in terms of noetics – as the conceptual acquisition of an object – as opposed to semi-
otics—as the acquisition of a representation built out of signs [20]. Yet, noetics cannot happen without
semiotics: no learning of mathematical concepts is actually possible if not via sign manipulation—
since in math you do not learn to actually manipulate concepts, but the corresponding semiotic rep-
resentations, instead.
Many different semiotic representations are possible for the same concept: a (straight) line could be
represented in terms of common language, or, with a drawing, or, by means of the algebraic language—
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by switching through different semiotic registers. Moving from a representation of a concept in a given
register of semiotics to another in a different register (e.g., moving from a geometric representation
to the analytic representation of the same curve) is a transformation of conversion. Instead, changing
representation within the same register of semiotics (e.g., switching to a different analytic expression
of a curve) is a transformation of treatment.
Changing semiotic register is what is used in math to explain. For instance, converting between
polar and Cartesian coordinates in the representation of a curve (transformation of treatment), or,
switching from the analytic to the geometric definition of a curve (transformation of conversion),
are examples of manipulation of the semiotic representation that are usually adopted in order to
give a grasp of abstract mathematical objects—to actually explain them. So, explanation could then
be generally intended as an activity of transformation of semiotic register—of either conversion or
treatment, or both.
Explanation is then an operation by the explanator that does neither require nor ensure per se any
understanding by the explainee, yet can be intentionally geared in that direction once something of
the explainee is known by the explanator (e.g., by mind reading [17])—as it happens in teaching, by
the way. Limiting the definition of explanation to the act of an explanator only seems to better match
acceptations of the term like those implicitly used in human textbooks: there in fact explanations are
not explicitly directed towards any specific explainee, and just assume a general level of linguistic and
cultural competence by the generic reader.
As an aside, the notion of explanation as a transformation of semiotic register also looks more easily
in accordance with the original etymology of the word itself—from Latin explanare, which also means
‘spread’, ‘unfold’, ‘straighten out’. According to that, explanation can be seen as an activity of sym-
bolic representation and transformation by the explanator, aimed at making the subjective activity of
interpretation by the explainee easier—as in [4].
Once the notion of explanation has been framed, now: who is the explanator, who the explainee?
Or, more specifically: can we proceed beyond the simplistic hypothesis that software systems / agents
are the explanators, and explainees are just humans?
4.3. Explanation for humans
Almost all works on explainability have one aim in common: making intelligent systems understand-
able to humans. As one can observe from many surveys – e.g., [21, 22, 23] –, explanators are typically
software components (such as agents in multi-agent systems), explainees are intended to be humans.
Thus, explanations are mostly intended to work as one-direction tools: from agents to humans. First,
agents do something bright and complex and unintelligible for humans; then, in order to make it
acceptable for humans, agents are expected to explain themselves to humans in some way.
Before we proceed further, it is worth pointing out how this assumption is already quite unsat-
isfactory as it is. In fact, the ability of software systems to effectively interact with humans is such
a problematic issue in general that we are likely to devote some of the forthcoming decades to the
full development of conversational informatics [24] as a multi-disciplinary field aimed at capturing all
the diverse dimensions and nuances of human conversational skills in terms of conversational agents.
Since our goal there is basically to level agents up to the human conversational abilities, it looks some-
how pretentious today to assume that an explanation from an agent to a human is something that we
can easily handle already in general.
Also, as much as this may look at a first glance as obvious and natural, it is not the only possibility:
an agent providing a human with an explanation is not the only way in which explanation could be
useful and work. This is apparent in teaching theory, of course: both explanators and explainees there
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are humans, even when they are supported by artificial systems of any sorts—as in the case of tools
for distance learning.
Furthermore, by exploring in principle every possible direction that explanation could follow in
socio-technical systems (STS) – that is, artificial systems where both humans and artificial components
play the role of system components [25] –, humans explaining to agents would require agents to
exhibit just the same level of conversational abilities that the agent-to-human explanation mandates
for—not an easy task still nowadays.
What about software systems, instead? Is there any reasonable way in which software components
could use some notion of explanation to interact with each other, and not just with some human? Or,
by changing the viewpoint over software systems, is there any meaningful way to make explanation a
general tool for intelligent systems engineers, used to make interaction and communication between
intelligent components more expressive and effective?
4.4. Agents communicating in MAS
Agents and multi-agent systems (MAS) are the richest providers of abstractions, technologies, and
methodologies for complex intelligent systems [26]. Agent interaction within MAS at its most fun-
damental level typically exploits agent communication languages (ACL) [27], which are one of the
oldest standard in the MAS field [28], and are shaped around Searle’s theory of human communi-
cation based on speech acts [29]. ACL generally set the stage for agent interoperability in MAS, by
providing communicating agents with shared syntax and ontology.
This is particularly relevant in the case of open and heterogeneous MAS, where ACL standards
allow in principle diverse agents to effectively interact and communicate with each other overcoming
their difference in terms of model, architecture, and technology. For instance, within an intelligent
system used in the legal domain, some legal agents could be deep learning agents trained over diverse
sets of existing legal databases; others might be logic-based agents, rationally elaborating over some
symbolic representation of some legal corpus. In spite of their fundamental heterogeneity, ACL would
make communication possible between the two very different sorts of agents.
More generally, agreement technologies [30] – e.g., semantic web, coordination models and lan-
guages, norms, e-Institutions, dialogue, negotiation, argumentation, . . . – go beyond the mere level
of agent communication. For instance, agreement technologies are essential in the case of case of
computable law, described in [31] as a “multi-agent system based on argumentation, dialogue, and
conversation”. There, agents do not just communicate with each other: when they make statements,
agents should provide arguments to support them, to be understood and possibly accepted.
Yet, agreement technologies do not directly addresses in general issues such as explainability, in-
terpretability, transparency, and understandability. For instance, in the field of computable law, some
highly-heterogenous agents in a decision-support system within a legal process might be asked to
go beyond just argumenting and supporting their suggestions and decision proposals—so, beyond
explaining themselves to humans. Instead, they could be required to interact with each other – and,
more specifically, to understand each other – in order to (first of all) cooperatively build a common,
well-motivated proposal – or, a well-reasoned list of possible alternatives –, to be (then) presented to
human decision makers in a potentially-understandable way.
This, of course, would require that agents, whatever their nature – symbolic vs. sub symbolic vs.
hybrid – are capable not only of communicating via ACL and interacting with each other via agree-
ment technologies, but also of representing their cognitive process and achievements in a rational form
that could be effectively shared not just with humans, but also, first and foremost, with other agents.
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4.5. Agent sharing in MAS
Broadly speaking, analogy is not always the best way to proceed in multi- and inter-disciplinary
contexts, and should be feared in the scientific practice for how easily it may mislead researchers. Yet,
when dealing with intelligent agents and MAS – possibly for the way in which agent reasoning agent
action are modelled after their human equivalent, and MAS are modelled after human societies –, this
has worked quite well and quite often in the last few decades: intentional stance in agent reasoning
[32], speech acts in agent communication [29], activity theory for agent coordination [33] are just
some examples.
So, in the same way as humans share knowledge and cognition in cooperative contexts, agent
cooperation in open and heterogeneous MAS seemingly mandates for sharing among agents, since
(i) agents are generally-opaque entities, (ii) trivial agent semantics à la ARCOL (where agents are
assumed to be sincere—that is, they say only what they do believe [27]) are not practical in real-
world open MAS, (iii) notions such as trust and reputation are hardly effective in open and dynamics
systems, and do not scale up easily with system size. Sharing not just knowledge, but also their
own cognitive processes, would in principle allow agents to understand each other at a deepest level
possible in open and heterogeneous MAS, by making agent intelligence as transparent as possible to
other agents.
As a means to make sharing effective, explanation – as a mere act of the explanator, and in the
general acceptation of transformation of semiotic register – has the potential to work as a powerful
enhancer of agent-to-agent communication, as well as an expressive extension to agreement tech-
nologies.
4.6. Explanation for agents
Along this line, one may picture agent-based intelligent systems as made of explanation-ready agents,
as agents of any nature and sort equipped with their own specific rational explanation capability. So,
in principle, any intelligent agent would be built with the ability of providing a rational, sharable
representation of their own specific cognitive process and results, as well as of manipulating such a
representation in order to build one or more explanations.
If an explanation is a transformation of the semiotic register, the expressive power of an explanation-
ready agent could be basically measured by its ability to deal with different semiotic registers in its do-
main of discourse, and to switch between diverse representations within each of them—thus producing
explanations in terms of both transformations of conversions and transformations of treatment, re-
spectively.
Architecturally, this would imply that intelligent agents of any sort should be equipped with their
own explanation module, matching the specific agent cognitive process so as to produce a symbolic
representation of the process itself as well as of its results: and this should hold for both intuitive agents
– as those adopting sub-/non-symbolic techniques – and rational ones—as those built around symbolic
techniques. Also, intelligent agents should be provided with enough knowledge of the domain of
discourse to make them capable of symbolic manipulation of the representation in the form of a




After pointing out that the issue of understanding and modelling (human) intelligence dates far be-
fore the birth of AI, we start from the observation that the classic philosophical distinction between
rationally and intuition in human cognition roughly matches the well-known dichotomy of contem-
porary AI techniques—that is, symbolic vs. sub/non-symbolic, respectively. We then note that the
overwhelming success of sub-symbolic techniques (such as deep learning ones) has not moved AI
really far from its symbolic core. Yet, symbolic techniques nowadays are mostly seen as support-
ing actually-working AI technologies such as deep learning in real-world intelligent systems. This is
particularly evident in the XAI field, where symbolic techniques are exploited to complement sub-
symbolic components and provide them with human-understandable explanations.
Thus, in this paper we first advocate that the very notion of explanation needs to be defined more
precisely than it currently is in the literature, specifically as an explanator’s act—so, as a premise for
the possible explainee’s understanding, not including it. Then, we suggest that explanation should
not be seen as a mere add-on for intelligent systems, and should instead work as an essential tool for
any intelligent component—in particular, agents in multi-agent systems. Also, we argue that intelligent
agents should be able to able to explicitly represent their cognitive process and its results, and manip-
ulate those representations, so that rational explanation would properly complement their ability to
reason and communicate. As a result, intelligent agents should be able to explain themselves first of
all to other agents, not just towards humans. In this context, symbolic techniques are to be used for
explanations, to enable agents to represent and manipulate their own cognitive processes and their
results, and to understand explanations from other agents.
Overall, we advocate that both explanation and symbolic techniques should play the role of first-
class citizens in both agent modelling and intelligent systems engineering.
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